Alternative Dispute Resolution in a New Health Care System: Will it Work for Everyone? by Meili, Stephen & Packard, Tamara
Alternative Dispute Resolution in a New Health Care
System: Will it Work for Everyone?
STEPHEN MEILI*
TAMARA PACKARD"*
PREFATORY NOTE: This article was written prior to the conclusion of
the most recent session of Congress, during which Congress took no
action on President Clinton's health care reform package. Although this
article uses that package's Early Resolution Program as an example of
ADR in health care systems, its analysis, conclusions, and
recommendations are equally applicable to whatever type of health care
reform is adopted.
I. INTRODUCTION
In October 1993, President Clinton released his proposal for health care
reform, the Health Security Act (HSA or the Act). While most of the
country focused on the benefits package, managed care structure, and
associated costs, several observers wondered how the President's plan
would affect disputes between patients and their health care providers,'
health plans, and alliances. The HSA creates or permits several dispute
resolution fora, including the Early Resolution Program (ERP). The ERP
offers several forms of alternative dispute resolution (ADR).2 Proponents
point to ADR as one of the consumer protections that are "the heart of the
Health Security Act." 3
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1 Throughout this article we will refer to doctors, nurses, therapists, and other health
care professionals, as well as hospitals and clinics, as "providers."
2 We recognize that ADR is a loosely and sometimes ill-defined term that covers
procedures ranging from written grievance forms to mediation to quasi-formal administrative
hearings. However, we are reluctant to narrow the scope of the term for purposes of this
article, since the HSA would permit states and their health care cooperatives to utilize the
entire range of such procedures.
3 Health Security Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the House Comm. on
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During the most recent Congressional session, at least five other health
care reform proposals were. Of those, at least three require some form of
ADR in the resolution of disputes between consumers, health plans, and
providers. 4 Meanwhile, many state legislatures are also considering health
care reform, and most of these proposals envision some use of ADR.
This Article first reviews some of the general advantages and
disadvantages of ADR, and applies this critique to the health care dispute
context. It then addresses the effects of ADR on traditionally disempowered
people such as minorities, women, and the poor. Finally, it offers some
conclusions and recommendations to ensure that ADR procedures protect all
consumers in the newly emerging health care marketplace.
A. Consumer Disputes Under the Health Security Act
The HSA offers numerous ways to resolve health care disputes
informally. Consumers must first attempt resolution through the health
plan's grievance procedure and any other remedies the plan wishes to offer.5
Consumers may also seek help from an ombudsman, established by each
regional alliance, to informally resolve the dispute.6 If a consumer continues
to be dissatisfied and if the dispute satisfies applicable guidelines, the
consumer may file a complaint with the state's complaint review office. 7
The complaint review office only reviews complaints that allege a
health plan or alliance denied or delayed payment or provision of benefits
under the plan, and that the denial or delay was in violation of the terms of
the plan or the HSA. 8 Complainants are allowed to choose the forum of
Ways and Means, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 2, 1994) (statement of Philip R. Lee, M.D.,
Assistant Secretary for Health, Department of Health and Human Services).
4 Gina Kolata, Will U.S. Be Healthier? Maybe Not, Eperts Say, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 17,
1993, at 1 (chart) (discussing the use of ADR for malpractice claims).
5 H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1405(a) (1993); Id. § 5202(c).
6 Id. § 1326(a).
7 1d. § 5202(b). Each state must provide a complaint review office for each alliance
established by that state. Id. § 5202(a)(1).
8 Id. § 5202(b). In addition, before the complaint review office will accept a complaint,
the complainant must have exhausted all remedies provided under the plan (i.e., the plan's
grievance procedure). H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5202(c) (1993). Some problems,
such as minor service complaints, are handled only at the plan level. The HSA calls for
medical malpractice claims to be handled at the plan level using mediation and arbitration. If a
complainant remains unsatisfied, a certificate of merit must be obtained before proceeding to
court. Kolata, supra note 4, at I (chart).
The Health Security Act establishes a separate process for alternative dispute resolution
of medical malpractice disputes. Id. §§ 5301-06 (1993). Discussion of this process is beyond
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resolution: they may choose to go directly to court (with limited
exceptions), 9 proceed with a hearing in the state's complaint review
office, 10 or submit the complaint to the ERP.11
The Early Resolution Program offers various forms of ADR ranging
from mediation to binding arbitration. 12 Complainants may choose
mediation by entering into a written agreement (presumably with the ERP,
although the Act does not specify this), and all parties selected by a
complainant are required to cooperate with the proceedings. 13 In mediation,
formal rules of evidence do not apply, there are no formal proceedings and
no statements or evidence under oath. 14 Parties may be represented by
attorneys in mediation and in other ERP proceedings. 15 ERP mediator
findings are advisory and non-binding. 16 Settlements reached through
mediation become enforceable through a settlement contract. 17
It is clear from this brief overview that the Clinton Administration has
determined ADR is preferable to litigation for solving health care disputes.
The HSA requires consumers to attempt to resolve such disputes in
numerous non-litigious ways before resorting to court. However, before
adopting a health care system that relies so heavily on ADR, it would be
wise to review the comparative advantages and disadvantages of ADR and
litigation, especially as they apply to the health care context. It is to such a
the scope of this article.
9 This article does not address the implications of ERISA on complainants' rights to file
a lawsuit against a health plan or alliance.
10 The state's - complaint review office - hearing is a process similar to other
administrative hearing processes. It employs written complaints, answers, a hearing with a
neutral hearing officer, witness testimony, and some written record. H.R. 3600, lb3d Cong.,
1st Sess. § 5204(a)-(c) (1993). The hearing officer writes an opinion and order which includes
findings of fact and a decision for or against the complainant based on a preponderance of the
evidence. it. § 5204(d). Any party to the complaint may appeal the hearing officer's decision
to the Federal Health Plan Review Board (FHPRB), which has limited review powers. It. §§
5204(e), 5205(c), (d). Decisions by the FHPRB may be appealed to the appropriate U.S.
Court of Appeals and then to the U.S. Supreme Court, but only if the amount at issue exceeds
$10,000. 1d. § 5205(e).
11 Id. § 5203(a).
12H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5211(a) (1993). The Health Security Act
prescribes the form of mediation only and leaves the prescription of other forms of ADR to
the Secretary of Labor.
13 Id. § 5212(b) & (c).
14 Id. § 5213(e).
15 Id. § 5213().
'6 Id. § 5214(a).
17 H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5214(b) (1993).
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review that this article now turns.
II. ADR AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO LITIGATION
The shortcomings of litigation are well known: it is costly, time
consuming, procedurally cumbersome, and requires great amounts of social
resources. Many complain the results are unfair, or that certain cases are
frivolous and a waste of valuable court resources. Moreover, even
monetarily successful litigants frequently feel unsatisfied - and sometimes
betrayed - by a process from which they are often kept at arms length.
Many have touted ADR as the solution to these problems: it costs less
money, requires less time, utilizes fewer social resources, reduces court case
loads, and usually involves the parties more directly in the process. But is
ADR really the solution to our litigation problems in the health care
context?
A. Advantages of Alternative Dispute Resolution
ADR is perhaps most helpful when a consumer wants a complaint taken
seriously, but full-blown litigation is not the most appropriate way to
resolve it. For those disputes primarily involving hurt feelings and
misunderstandings, a less costly and time consuming mediation option will
often be appropriate. Ann Kellett, writing about medical malpractice
disputes, suggests that in these cases consumers do not really want money
from the provider; they want an explanation, the opportunity to talk with
the provider about their anxieties, or an apology. 18 ADR offers the
opportunity for open discussion of all issues, including underlying non-legal
issues. 19 This is particularly helpful in the health care context where
consumers and providers often - and under the HSA may be required to -
carry on long-term relationships. A second advantage of ADR is that its
comparative privacy, informality, and shorter resolution time causes the
defendant less "trauma" 20 than the more drawn out, public litigation
18 Catherine S. Meschievitz, Mediation and Medical Malpractice: Problems with
Definition and Implementation, 54 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBS. 195 (1991); Ann J. Kellett,
R.N., Comment, Healing Angry Wounds: The Roles of Apology and Mediation in Disputes
Between Physicians and Patients, 1987 J. Disp. REsOL. I11, 124.
19 Andrew McMuflen, Comment, Mediation and Medical Malpractice Disputes:
Potential Obstacles in the Traditional Lawyer's Perspective, 2 J. Disp. RESOL. 371, 373-74
(1990).
20 Thomas B. Metzloff, Alternative Dispute Resolution Strategies in Medical
Malpractice, 9 ALASKA L. REv. 429, 435 (1992).
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process. 21 In the health care context, the less traumatic ADR setting should
permit the provider to work more honestly with the consumer. Ultimately,
ADR can maintain or even improve an ongoing relationship, 22 such as the
relationship between health care consumers and their providers, plan, and
alliance. Conversely, litigation tends to polarize the parties and enhance
hostilities, 23 and can disrupt ongoing relationships. 24
ADR also allows for unique solutions not available through litigation.25
An ADR resolution need not be exclusively win or lose, money based, or
grounded in the statutory or common law of remedies. For example, to
resolve a health care coverage dispute, parties may decide on a compromise
treatment that is less costly than the treatment originally requested, but
which addresses most of the consumer's medical problems. Alternatively,
the provider and patient may agree to split the treatment costs, or place an
upper cost limit above which the provider pays. In these ways, ADR can
help parties focus on the patient's health, rather than get bogged down in,
and distracted by, the concerns of precedent and publicity associated with
litigation.
One study found that parties in small claims court prefer ADR to trial
and are much more likely to comply with ADR agreements.26 Parties also
felt they had a better opportunity to present their side of the case,
understood the process better, and were more satisfied overall than those
whose cases were decided by a judge.27 No reason exists to believe health
care consumers would feel differently from other disputants.
There is also a general consensus that ADR saves money, at least for
providers. In the 1970's, the Hospital Arbitration Project found that
21 This is particularly true in the medical malpractice context, where providers see
lawsuits as akin to criminal proceedings, and speak in terms of innocence and guilt. Id.
22 McMullen, supra note 19, at 373-74.
23 Kellett, supra note 18, at 128.
24 James F. Henry, ADR and Personal Injury Litigation, 23 TRIAL 73 (Apr. 1987).
25 McMullen, supra note 19, at 373-74.
26 Linda Singer et al., Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Poor, Part I: What ADR
Processes Exist and Why Advocates Should Become Involved, 26 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 142,
145-46 (May/June 1992) [hereinafter Singer et al., Part 1] (citing Craig MeEwen & Richard
Maiman, Small Claims Mediation in Maine: An Empirical Assessment, 22 ME. L. REv. 237,
261-63 (1981)).
27 Singer et al., Part I, supra note 26, at 14546. However, another study found that
litigants felt they understood the litigation process better than several forms of ADR, felt they
had participated more in litigation than in any of the ADR options, and felt equally
comfortable with all options. E. Allen Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants'
Evaluations of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 953, 967
(1990).
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hospitals that used arbitration spent fifty-nine percent less on defense costs
than other hospitals. 28 However, the General Accounting Office reported in
1990 that while medical malpractice arbitration was less time consuming,
the average cost to litigants in Michigan was comparable in the litigation
and arbitration systems; i.e., arbitration was no cheaper than litigation. 29
Other advantages of ADR include the involvement of expert decision
makers rather than judges who may not be well-versed in a particular
subject area and the involvement of court-appointed experts rather than
party-chosen experts. Health care disputants are likely to benefit from these
features because medicine and insurance are highly specialized fields. ADR
can also address smaller claims that consumers cannot afford to bring before
a court.30 In the health care context, consumers with smaller claims
frequently cannot find an attorney willing to take their case on a
contingency fee basis and are unwilling to hire an attorney on an hourly
basis when the attorney's total bill is likely to exceed the value of the
disputed claim. Finally, ADR provides an early review of claims and thus
acts as a gatekeeper to the litigation system.3 1
B. General Disadvantages of Alternative Dispute Resolution
One of the most troubling aspects associated with alternative dispute
resolution from the consumer's perspective relates to the same privacy that
makes it so appealing to providers. For instance, the less publicity a
malpractice claim receives, the less likely the provider will be investigated
by the state medical examiners. 32 It also means that the provider is less
likely to lose patients who might otherwise learn of a malpractice suit in the
media. This makes the provider, no matter how incompetent, feel more
secure. Moreover, if the provider is incompetent or dangerous, the state
medical examiners may not hear of the provider's behavior until after more
consumers are harmed.
28 Neil D. Schor, Note, Health Care Providers and Alternative Dispute Resolution:
Needed Medicine to Combat Medical Malpractice Claims, 4 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 65,
75 (1988).
2 9 Metzloff, supra note 20, at 439, (citing U.S. GEN. ACCr. OFF. , MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE: FEW CLAIMS RESOLVED THROUGH MICHIGAN'S VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION
PROGRAM (1990)). Much litigation in the health care context (at least for medical malpractice)
is contingency fee based. Thus, no matter how little time it takes to resolve a case, the
consumer often pays the same amount for legal services.
3 0 Id. at 436.
31 Id. at 437.
32 Alicia Roberts, Alternative Resolution Takes Less Money, Time; So Arbitrate or
Negotiate - Just Don't Litigate, 5 MANAGED CARE L. OUTLOOK 1, 4 (Jan. 1993).
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Privacy also harms the public at large in other health care disputes,
such as those over claim denials. In ADR, frequent plan misbehavior may
remain unknown to the public, and individual consumers may fight the same
battles over and over again.33 In the same vein, private dispute resolution
makes it difficult for similarly wrongly-treated individuals from acting as a
class against the wrongdoer. It also prevents the wider public interest from
being represented.34
Another problem related to the issue of privacy is that resolving
disputes through ADR does not develop the law or establish precedent on
which other consumers can rely. As CIGNA's senior vice president and
chief counsel put it, the "result [of the dispute] will be based on current law
and not on a new extension, expansion, or contraction of established
principles of law. " 35 Litigation is desirable when precedent needs to be set
or changed. 36 This is especially important in the area of health care claim
denials. Under many current insurance contracts, claims can be denied if the
treatment is experimental or investigatory; the HSA contemplates that these
grounds for denial will continue to exist.37 However, what is experimental
today may become generally accepted practice tomorrow. The law must
continue to evolve along with medical practice. If consumers are limited by
precedent to what was standard treatment in 1994, in 1996 they will be
denied treatments that are due them under the HSA or their insurance
contract. Thus, in disputes over experimental treatment, consumers are
likely to have greater success with a lawsuit than ADR. 38
33 Some health care reform proposals, including the HSA, call for a "report card"
system. It would be appropriate for this report card to gather and make publicly available
information about consumer complaints and how they are handled.
34 Michele G. Hermann, The Dangers of ADR: A Three-Tiered System of Justice, 3 J.
CONTEM. LEGAL IssuEs 117, 118 (1989-90). On a macro-political level, the informal nature
may inhibit change because without open hearings, discontent is hidden from view and
political confrontations are reduced. Id. at 119-20.
35 Robert L. Robinson, ADR in the Insurance Industry: One Company's Perspective, 45
ARB. J. 24, 25 (Sept. 1990). See also Singer et al., Part I, supra note 26, at 146-47 (arguing
that some practitioners strongly dislike the use of mediation in family disputes and divorce
because it cannot develop, expand, and enforce women's rights).
36 Linda Singer et al., Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Poor-Part Hf: Dealing with
Problems in Using ADR and Choosing a Process, 26 CLEANGHOUSE REv. 288 (July 1992)
[hereinafter Singer et al., Part 11].
37 H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5201(e)(2) & (3) (1993).
38 Moreover, since ADR procedures normally do not allow for punitive damages (or
place caps on such damages), they are less likely than litigation to compel an insurer to agree
to cover the costs of a procedure which they consider to be experimental.
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IlI. SPECIAL CONCERNS FOR WOMEN, MINORITIES, AND THE POOR
ABOUT ALTERNATiVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
In addition to the general disadvantages of ADR for health care
consumers outlined above, additional problems exist particular to
disempowered groups such as women, minorities, and the poor. These
problems stem from the informality of ADR, which is often touted as one of
its primary advantages. However, for disempowered groups, informality
may make ADR too risky.
Critical race theorists and most feminist legal theorists agree that formal
adjudication rules and procedures are important to fair outcomes. 39 These
rules and procedures protect women and minorities by limiting discretion,
which otherwise can be used to hide prejudice.40 Adjudication bolsters
weaker parties with rules to protect the oppressed, and judicial authority can
be used to balance uneven sides. 4 1 Adjudication also focuses on rights-
claiming ,or asserting and vindicating rights, 42 which is especially
important for women, minorities, and the poor. This process of asserting
and vindicating rights focuses public awareness on the existence of those
rights for the disempowered.
43
Alternatively, by shifting the focus (particularly in mediation) away
from rights and toward compromise, ADR tends to maintain the status quo
of disenfranchised parties.44 In mediation, discussion of principles, blame,
and rights is avoided or de-emphasized, while values of compromise and
relationship are encouraged. 45 "One adverse consequence of de-emphasizing
discussion of principle and fault is that some persons may be discouraged
from asserting their rights when they have been injured. "46
Even worse, in emerging areas of the law or in those traditionally
39 See, e.g., Hermann, supra note 34, at 118; Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative:
Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1557-58, 1566-67 (1991); Richard
Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative
Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1359, 1367-75. But see Eve Hill, Alternative Dispute
Resolution in a Feminist Voice, 5 OHIo ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 337 (1990).
40 Hermann, supra note 34, at 118.
41 In practice, however, it is unclear whether this really happens. There is sufficient
evidence of great imbalances and misbehavior in court to find that courts are in fact failing in
their ability to provide just, equal dispute forums. Id. at 118-19.
42 Grllo, supra note 39, at 1564.
43 id. at 1557-58.
44 Id. See also Hermann, supra note 34, at 120 (critics of ADR say women's social
disadvantages will be perpetuated in an informal process).
45 Grillo, supra note 39, at 1561-62.
4 6 Id. at 1565.
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subject to informal resolution, such as domestic disputes, parties may not
even be aware of their legal rights. 47 Similarly, in medical malpractice
cases, consumers rarely have the knowledge to assess whether providers
have violated the standard of care. 48 Assigning issues to ADR before parties
know their legal rights can exacerbate the exploitation of those parties. "To
the extent that the mediation process makes it difficult to assert rights, the
positive implications of rights-assertion for women, the poor, and
minorities of either sex will be lost."49 The following subsections address
dangers particular to women, minorities, and the poor, respectively.
A. Women
During the 1970's and early 1980's, many feminist legal theorists
embraced the theories of cultural feminists, the most well-known of whom
is Carol Gilligan.50 These theorists criticize litigation for requiring women
to speak "like men" and frame experience in male terms. 51 They claim that
law acts as a bar to women presenting women's experience on women's
terms in the legal system. 52 These authors feel that ADR, when conducted
in a cooperative rather than competitive manner, has more room for female
perspective, voice, and methods.5 3 At the same time, they recognize that
these advantages are limited by the possibility of competitive opposing
parties abusing the cooperative nature of a process.M4
Other feminist theorists, including post-modernists, conclude that
mediation is no more inherently just or humane than litigation.55 While
litigation has been criticized for not allowing participants to tell their stories
by limiting what is brought to court through rules of legal relevance,
admissibility, and the framing of legal issues, ADR, especially mandatory
mediation, can also force parties to speak unnaturally:
[Mediation] can be destructive to many women and some men because it
47 Singer et al., Part I, supra note 26, at 152-53.
4 8 Moreover, our work in representing low income petitioners with denied health
insurance claims demonstrates that many health care consumers are unaware of their right to
challenge such denials, either through informal arbitration under their health insurance
contract, through the State Commissioner of Insurance, or through litigation.
49 Grillo, supra note 39, at 1567.
50 See CAROL GILoAN, IN A DFFERENT VoICE (1982).
51 Hill, supra note 39, at 356-62.
5 2 id.
53 Id, at 370-76.
54 Id.
55 Grillo, supra note 39, at 1548.
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requires them to speak in a setting they have not chosen and often imposes
a rigid orthodoxy as to how they should speak, make decisions, and
be .... It is an orthodoxy that often excludes the possibility of the
parties' speaking with their authentic voices.
5 6
For instance, mediators frequently discourage the expression of anger.
57
Such suppression can be highly detrimental to women by reinforcing the
socialized message that anger is unfeminine. 58 Rather than express anger,
women are taught to suppress it and make peace or suffer the discrediting
title of "bitch. "9 However, anger can be an important source of power and
strength. 60 Discouraging the expression of anger can disempower a woman
who has only recently found it. The message that anger is not legitimate is
particularly damaging -to black women. 61 Societal fear of anger from
minorities, especially blacks, coupled with the fear of anger from women,
compounds the disempowering and disabling effects of the discouragement
of anger. 62
Rather than discouraging and discrediting women's anger, mediators
must recognize its legitimacy. Disputes in the health care setting often
involve issues of interpersonal insensitivity, 63 and if consumers are not
allowed to fully and honestly express their anger over the other party's
insensitivity, the resolution will likely be less than complete. On a macro-
level, women's anger will continue to be discredited.
Both cultural and post-modem feminist legal theorists are concerned
with how power imbalances between parties affect women in ADR. ADR,
especially mediation, requires parties to frame the issues and explain
matters. 64 Women have less social power, and, in the words of one author,
56 Grilo, supra note 39, at 1548-50.
57 Id. at 1548. Much of the research in this part of Grillo's article is based on the use of
mediation in divorce and child custody disputes. However, because Grillo proceeds to
generalize these findings to apply to women in all kinds of mediation, we feel comfortable
doing the same.
58 Grillo, supra note 39, at 1576.
59 Id. at 1576-77.
60Id. at 1572.
61 Id. at 1581.
62 Id. at 1579-81.
63 Kellett, supra note 18, at 123 (citing Marilynn L. May & Laura DeMarco, Patients
and Doctors Disputing: Patients' Complaints and What They Do About Them, INsTrrUTE FOR
LEGAL STUDIES, DisPuTEs PRocESsING RESEARCH PROGRAM, WORKING PAPERS SERIES 7
(Mar. 1986)).
64 Hilary Astor, Feminist Issues in ADR, LAW INST. J., Jan./Feb. 1991, at 69-71.
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speak in a voice that is "the voice of the victim." 65 Put another way,
women express an "ethic of care," while men express a "morality of
rights." The latter is more valued in dominant society.66 This causes
decision makers and opponents to give less weigfit to what women say, and
puts women at a particular disadvantage when they participate in ADR. 67
Thus, in the health care setting, power differentials will often put women at
a disadvantage because providers tend to be white, male, and professional.
Finally, the confidential nature of ADR endangers women's recently
recognized and currently developing rights. In the health care setting,
women experience harassment and discrimination in services and treatment.
The danger of resolving these issues through ADR is that they may remain
shrouded from public scrutiny. 68 They may also be resolved according to
unarticulated, unappealable social norms. 69 Thus, many of the assumed
"strengths" of alternative dispute resolution - compromise, informality,
and individual expression - may also be its primary weaknesses, especially
for women.
B. Minorities
Blacks and whites have significant differences in values and priorities,
due to their very different social status and experience. 70 Blacks are more
likely than whites to question traditional notions of individualism. Blacks
also tend to put a higher premium on alternative values of social
responsibility, even after controlling for social class differences. 71
Whether such differences are truly accommodated and valued in ADR
mechanisms is unknown, for no one has studied this claim. However,
critical race theorist Richard Delgado's theories relating to dominant norms
and informal settings assert that dominant norms control, often
unconsciously, in informal settings.72 Thus, white America's norms and
traditions such as individualism would control in arbitration. "[L]egal
forums that deliberately give greater importance to such implicit social
norms might work in process and outcome to disadvantage minority
65 Hill, supra note 39, at 363-70.
66 id.
67 GriUo, supra note 39, at 1550.
68 Astor, supra note 64, at 71.
69 Id.
70 Lawrence Bobo, Prejudice and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 12 STUD. IN L. POL.
AND Soc'y 147, 158 (1992).
71 id.
72 Delgado et al., supra note 39, at 1387-89.
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disputants.73
Delgado also suggests that informality leads to the expression of
prejudice, which makes ADR less accessible to minorities. 74 He cites
professional codes, legal doctrines, rules of evidence and civil procedure as
among the mechanisms that reign in prejudice. 75 The literal and institutional
structures of the courtroom and the litigation process are imbued with the
principle of the American creed: the public values of equality and
humanitarianism that people are inclined to adopt while in that setting
construct more fair proceedings and determinations. 76 Because such values
are not as overtly a part of the arbitration structure, Delgado concludes
"that formal dispute resolution is better at deterring prejudice than informal
adjudication. " 77 Delgado asserts that while the lack of procedural rules
make ADR time-saving and flexible, they it "open[s] the door wider" to
prejudiced behavior. 78
Finally, Delgado asserts that since minorities recognize that public
institutions are more subject to rational control, they trust them more than
private, informal structures to deliver justice. 79 Even if this perception is
not as true as minorities may believe, he says it becomes self-fulfilling.80
Delgado's assertion is supported by a survey conducted by The Wirthlin
Group for the National Institute of Dispute Resolution. The study revealed
that those who said they were "not at all likely" to use arbitration or
mediation tended to be older, members of minority groups, and had a high
school education or less. 81 Similarly, those who said they were more likely
to go to court tended to be males (of all races surveyed) between 30 and 39
with a high school education or less, and earned under $20,000.82 These
profiles indicate that those with less social power, i.e., minorities, people
with less education, and people with lower income, feel safer in court. No
doubt that when people with little social power are in a dispute with some
of the most socially, politically, and economically powerful people in the
country, i.e., health care providers and insurance companies, they may
73 Bobo, supra note 70, at 150.
74 Delgado, supra note 39, at 1367-75.
7 Id.
76 Id. at 1383-88.
77 Delgado, supra note 39, at 1375.
78 Id. (citing social science research on the operation of prejudice in formal and informal
settings, not litigation and ADR).
79 Id. at 1391.
80 Id.
81 The Wirthlin Group, National Survey Findings on: Public Opinion Towards Dispute
Resolution 26 (1992).
8 2 Id. at 16.
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frequently - and rationally - prefer court to ADR.
C. The Poor
Poor people have had significant experience in the ADR setting. ADR
programs are available on a voluntary basis in many areas of poverty law,
and a growing number of courts and agencies have made participation in
ADR mandatory in these areas.8 3 However, it -is unclear whether poor
people fare better with ADR than with the courts. According to some
practitioners, the poor may achieve more justice through ADR.84 Some
legal services lawyers find ADR appealing because clients appreciate the
active role they play in it. Such client participation is consistent with the
original conception of the legal services movement: empowerment of the
poor. 85 However, other legal services attorneys have avoided ADR because
many of its advocates are opposed to vigorous representation of the poor
and attempt to use it to create a labyrinthine maze to the cburthouse door. 86
Another problem is that poor people have no right and often no ability
to receive legal advice before, during, or after ADR. 87 This may leave them
vulnerable to the non-rights-focused weaknesses of ADR: poor people may
never learn their legal (or non-legal) rights and options. 88 The Health
Security Act specifically allows parties to proceed with a lawyer or pro se in
the ERP. 89 While providers and health plans (or at least their attorneys) will
undoubtedly know their legal rights before entering the ADR process, poor
consumers may not. This will exacerbate the already wide power differential
between consumers on one side, and providers and health plans on the
other. In addition, the ERP does not provide winning consumers the
opportunity to collect their costs and legal fees from their opponents, 90
while in the hearing process alternative, the HSA requires losing defendants
to pay reasonable consumers' attorney fees, expert witness fees, and other
hearing-related costs. 91 This encourages parties to proceed pro se in the
ERP so as not to incur these unrecoupable costs, and thus maintains the
power and knowledge differentials that put poor people at a procedural
disadvantage.
83 Singer et al., Part I, supra note 26, at 143-44.
84 Singer et al., Part I, supra note 36, at 289.85 Singer et al., Pat i, supra note 26, at 152.
86 Singer et al., Part H, supra note 36, at 289.
87 Herman, supra note 34, at 120-21.
88im
89 H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5213(t) (1993).
90 Id. § 5213.
91 Id. § 5204(d)(2)(A)Civ).
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IV. SOCIAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
According to legal theorist Sally Engle Merry, law is an important site
for the construction of meanings in society. 92 She argues that legal and
therapeutic discourses are more powerful than the third discourse of
morality because they require special training. 93 When officials require
certain legal disputes to be resolved according to morality discourse, they
give disputants the message that their problems are trivial and not suited for
court.94 This use of naming by legal institutions, she argues, is a form of
cultural domination.95 Merry found that the moral discourse is the primary
discourse used in mediation. 96
Though Merry's study is of interpersonal disputes brought to court and
assigned to mediation programs, her observations are relevant in the health
care dispute context as well. In health care, disputes are usually between
parties with ongoing relationships, and the power differences between the
parties are often dramatic, 97 just as in traditional interpersonal problems.
Party emotions are often significant factors in both contexts and may even
be the main reason for the dispute, rather than the discrete incident actually
complained of. When health care disputes are mediated and reconstructed in
moral rather than legal terms, consumers may be made to feel like second-
class citizens. While traditional legal remedies may be no "better" than
those offered through mediation, exclusion of a class of parties from legal
relief constitutes cultural domination. 98 Under the HSA, consumers do
retain the choice between litigation, administrative review, and ADR in the
Early Resolution Program. 99 The government must be sure that consumers
make their choice freely and that the ERP does not become a dumping
ground for consumer claims that officials deem less valuable.
The Lind study of tort litigants' evaluations of their experiences in
92 Sally Engle Merry, The Discourses of Mediation and the Power of Naming, 2 YALE J.
L. & HUMAN. 1 (1990).
93 Id. at 4-5.
94 Id. at 34-35.
95 Merry, supra note 92, at 5-6.
96 Id. at 8.
97 In health care relationships, providers hold all the medical information and
knowledge, carry the deification of the physician, and have expert and professional status.
Kellett, supra note 18, at 121. Consumers can rarely balance this vast professional and social
power.
98 Merry, supra note 92, at 35-36.
99 H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5203(a) (1993).
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several dispute resolution forums supports Merry's theory.100 They found
that litigants' degree of understanding and participation in their dispute
resolution process was in direct proportion to the degree of process
formality. In addition, "litigants were substantially more likely to view the
procedure as fair when they felt the litigation process was dignified." 10
This study supports Merry's theoretical discussion and suggests that the
most important factor in participants' evaluation of process fairness is the
amount of dignity and formality afforded. The authors explain:
Our findings show that reduced cost and delay, however desirable in their
own right, cannot be counted on to increase litigant satisfaction and to
enhance feelings of procedural justice. Indeed, if the innovation in
question somehow interferes with the enactment of a sufficiently dignified
procedure, our findings suggest it will lead to dissatisfaction and
perceived unfairness. 102
Arbitration and other ADR processes can be structured so as to give
participants a hearing that they will feel is fair. It is important that such
processes afford sufficient formality, dignity, and objectively fair hearings.
Without these features, ADR participants will lose faith in the process and
feel that their disputes have second-class status.
A. Recommendations
Health care reform will bring many currently uninsured people into the
health care system, a disproportionate number of whom are low-income,
minorities, and women. Any revised health care system must accommodate
all of its consumers, especially disenfranchised people, if it is to make the
overall society healthier. One place to focus this accommodation is in the
dispute resolution system. Whether or not such a system is indeed accessible
to women, poor people, and minorities depends on how well designed and
implemented it is. If the costs are lower and the delivery is not prejudiced,
nor perceived to be so, then the result should be greater access to justice.
1. Training
Mediator and arbitrator training is absolutely essential to creating a
process that is free of bias. 103 Along with their training in how to resolve
100 Lind et al., supra note 27, at 982.
'0' Id. at 972.
102 Lind et al., supra note 27, at 984.
103 Hermann, supra note 34, at 120; Astor, supra note 64, at 71.
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disputes, mediators must be made aware of their own socialized biases, so
as to avoid unfair results. 104 They must also be taught how to identify and
compensate or correct power imbalances between the parties appearing
before them while not compromising their neutrality. 1 05
2. Formality
ADR procedures must be as formal as possible, 106 and all parties and
officials must show respect for the process and each other. This will
encourage a perception of procedural fairness, will give parties faith in the
process, and will prevent parties from feeling like they have second-class
status. The process should also be rights-focused and precedent-based.
Decisions should be made on the merits of the case. Compromise should be
encouraged, but not at the expense of legal rights.
Attorneys should be made available to poor consumers at the point that
the dispute leaves the health care plan forum. In the HSA, this is when the
consumer files a complaint with the state complaint review office.107
Attorneys can help counteract the gross inequalities between consumers and
providers in the ADR setting. Attorneys can also assist the consumer in
choosing the best forum in which to resolve the dispute. If the consumer
chooses the ERP program, the attorney can assist that person in choosing
the mediator/arbitrator.
3. Consumer Education
Many consumers have only a vague idea of what ADR is. Providers
and health care plans must be required to give consumers information
booldets about ADR written by an independent third party. Such
information will help consumers make the most informed choice between
the Early Resolution Program, the state complaint handling process, or
traditional litigation. Consumers should also receive information about their
rights as plan members and health care consumers.
Finally, the HSA provides for a "report card" on health care plans. As
currently drafted, the report card will provide consumers with outcome and
cost data. It will also provide them with information on medical malpractice
findings. While this information will be a vast improvement over what is
104 Astor, supra note 64, at 71.
105 Id. at 70-71.
106 A trade-off will necessarily exist between formality on the one hand and cost-
savings, flexibility, and compromise on the other. Every program must strike an appropriate
balance between the two, keeping in mind the values of both sides.
107 H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5202(b)(1) (1993).
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currently available to consumers, this report card should include many more
items. For instance, while the HSA requires reporting of court findings on
medical malpractice, it should also report results of ADR proceedings.
Plans should be required to report on the details of findings from the ERP
and the state complaint review process of unfair claim denial and delay.
They should report the number and nature of all complaints brought against
them, including those brought in court, ERP, the state complaint review
process, and at the plan grievance level. Finally, they should be required to
present information on other lawsuits or formal complaints brought against
them. All of this data collection and analysis should be conducted by neutral
third parties, and presented in a way that is comprehensible to the public.
V. CONCLUSION
Litigation is not always the appropriate way to resolve a conflict; it can
sometimes exacerbate a problem, particularly if the parties are involved in
an ongoing relaionship. On the other hand, ADR supporters claim that
relationships can be saved and even strengthened through the use of ADR.
Litigation does not address the emotional wounds of parties, while ADR
offers more opportunity to reconcile emotional issues. Litigation in the
health care setting does not adequately meet the goals typically achieved in
other kinds of litigation: pecuniary punishment and fair and equal
compensation for the wrongs committed. Doctors who commit malpractice
are not financially punished because they carry insurance.108 Litigation
cannot be used by all aggrieved consumers because only expensive claims
are worth bringing to court, compensation takes years, and awards often do
not correspond to injuries. 109
While ADR has a number of advantages, it also has serious
disadvantages and risks, especially for women, minorities, and the poor.
Those who design, implement, and preside procedures in any revised health
care system must consciously endeavor not to allow these disadvantages to
infiltrate the new system. Otherwise, all of the time, effort, and resources
directed at meaningful health care reform will have done little to alleviate
the long-standing power imbalances between consumers, providers, and
insurers.
108 KellcU, supra note 18, at 125.
109 Id.

